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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 702

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ITALIAN COOPERATION, AID REPORTED

Paris Marches TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 pp 2597-2602

[Article by Pierre Platon: "Trade Between Italy and Africa"]

[Text] African share: 10.76 percent of imports; 8.28 percent of exports. In 1979, open trade between Italy and the rest of the world totaled 124,575.24 billion lire, as against 95,373.82 billion lire in 1978, 81,693.82 billion lire in 1977 and 67,897.34 billion lire in 1976. In terms of current value, this trade volume increased by 83.48 percent, overall, between 1976 and 1979, in other words, at an annual average growth rate of 22.4 percent.

The sums given below are distributed as follows between incoming and outgoing goods (in billions of lire):

	Exports	Imports
1976	31,166.72	36,730.62
1977	39,736.20	41,957.62
1978	47,505.30	47,867.90
1979	59,924.81	64,650.43

This series of figures leads us to two findings:

(1) During the period of 1976-1979, exports grew faster (up 92.23 percent) than imports (up 76.01 percent);

(2) The balance of trade improved in favor of Italy as compared to the base year (1976). However, the balance was strongest in 1978.

Coverage of imports by exports evolved as follows: 1976, 84.84 percent; 1977, 94.71 percent; 1978, 99.24 percent; 1979, 92.69 percent.

Italy's trade with the outside world for the most part is conducted with Europe as shown by Table IT-AF-1. The peninsula is making between 59 and 60 percent of its total purchases in European countries and sells more than two-thirds of the commodities which it sells abroad to those same countries.

IT-AF-1. Italy--Total Imports and Exports, by Continents (in Billions of Lire)

	1976	1977	1978	1979
IMPORTS				
Europe	21 402,2	24 403,39	28 954,15	38 576,37
Africa	3 627,64	3 961,34	4 690,05	6 959,5
America	4 691,64	5 135,4	5 497,93	7 430,76
Asia	6 611,73	8 001,19	8 278,98	11 047,01
Oceania	384,08	440,29	427,98	612,22
Miscellaneous	13,33	16,01	18,82	24,57
	36 730,62	**41 957,62**	**47 867,9**	**64 650,43**
EXPORTS				
Europe	21 316,28	26 635,57	31 686,74	40 937,18
Africa	2 672,57	3 786,99	4 250,65	4 960,34
America	3 464,84	4 414,93	5 488,96	6 409,7
Asia	3 052,10	4 147,79	5 313,57	6 506,54
Oceania	252,62	275,58	307,25	427,72
Miscellaneous	408 31	475,34	478,12	683,33
	31 166,72	**39 736,2**	**47 506,3**	**59 924,81**

European Share (%)

	Imports	Exports
1976	58.27	68.39
1977	58.16	67.03
1978	60.49	66.66
1979	59.67	68.31

We find however in Table IT-AF-2 that the United States is a remarkable partner and that, by virtue of Italian purchases of hydrocarbons, some countries of the Middle East and two or three African countries are rather well placed in the list of foreign suppliers and customers.

IT-AF-2. Italy's First 15 International Suppliers and Customers, 1979 (in Billions of Lire)

Suppliers		Clients	
FRG	11,102.5	FRG	11,333.8
France	9,094	France	8,872.7
United States	4,385.4	Great Britain	3,915.7
Saudi Arabia	3,369.8	United States	3,874.1
The Netherlands	2,707.8	The Netherlands	2,746.6
Great Britain	2,613	Switzerland	2,561.8
Iraq	2,396.3	Benelux	2,046.7
Benelux	2,303.7	Libya	1,597.9
Libya	2,144.5	Saudi Arabia	1,563.2
Switzerland	1,772.8	Austria	1,506.4
USSR	1,714	Spain	1,107.9
South Africa	1,393.8	Yugoslavia	1,038.6
Austria	1,261.1	USSR	1,011.9
Kuwait	1,251.3	Greece	1,009.3
Spain	920.2	Algeria	892.6



IT-AF-A. Italian Foreign Trade, 1976-1979 (in Billions of Lire). Key: 1--Africa; 2--America; 3--Oceania and Miscellaneous.

For the year 1979, the positions of the various continents are as follows (percentages out of total trade volume):

	Imports	Exports
Europe	59.67	68.31
Asia	17.09	10.86
Africa	10.76	8.28
American	11.49	10.70
Oceania and miscellaneous	0.99	1.85

We note that the Italian balance of trade shows a deficit for all continents except Europe but the 6-percent figure for the European surplus, involving very large sums, reduced the imbalances observed in trade relations with Asia (58.90 percent coverage), Africa (71.27 percent) or America (86.25 percent) to rather reasonable proportions.

AT-AF-3. Total Italian Imports and Exports, 1978, 1979, Distributed by Commodity Categories (in Billions of Lire).

	A. Importations		B. Exportations	
	1978	1979	1978	1979
	–	–	–	–
I. Produits du secteur primaire	**5 577,3**	**6 717,05**	**1 523,68**	**1 954,43**
Agriculture	3 179.11	3 636.59	1 429.6	1 811.56
1 Élevage	1 501 46	1 828.42	19.44	28.29
2 Forêts	489.75	690.42	25	37.21
3 Chasse et pêche	406.98	561.62	47.64	77.37
II. Produits des industries extractives	**11 675,1**	**15 558,48**	**120,91**	**167,56**
4 Minerais métalliques	1 066.65	1 538.83	28.42	50.6
5 Minerais non métalliques	10 608.45	14 019.65	92.49	116.96
III. Produits des industries manufacturières	**30 615,5**	**42 374,9**	**45 860,71**	**57 802,82**
6 Produits pour l'alimentation humaine	3 043.01	3 847.27	1 221.63	1 797.52
7 Produits non destinés à l'alimentation humaine	1 095,47	1 609.64	95.13	157 82
8 Industries des boissons	163.06	226.24	619.5	958.26
9 Industries des tabacs	145.45	234.29	0.82	1.89
10 Industrie cuirs et peaux	351.12	702.92	765.91	1 049.95
11 Industrie textiles	1 616.6	2 468.9	5 146.17	5 028.61
12 Industrie du vêtement	352.86	530.77	3 867.41	5 342.94
13 Industrie du bois et liège	880.82	1 332.98	1 300.36	1 816.19
14 Industrie du papier non imprimé	726.87	1 086.64	458.23	592.66
15 Industrie du papier imprimé	61,75	74.97	346.72	427.98
16 Industrie photo, cinéma	58.64	75.26	66.81	79.28
17 Industrie métallurgique	4 228.53	6 251.35	4 276.73	4 890.07
18 Industrie mécanique	10 094.66	12 895.89	17 830.72	21 271.35
19 dont :				
Machines	3 851.05	4 937.62	8 230.81	9 704.47
20 Instruments de précision	1 560.91	1 986.54	1 160.45	1 485.24
21 Véhicules	3 959.38	5 048.09	5 863.09	6 996.18
22 Divers	723.32	923.64	2 576.38	3 085.47
23 Industrie de transformation des minerais non métalliques (sauf pétrole)	524.57	703.75	1 987.89	2 620.8
24 Industrie chimique et dérivés	5 700.23	8 336.64	6 168.35	8 332.02
19 dont :				
25 Chimiques de base	4 361.59	6 209.42	3 125.78	4 044.94
26 Distillation du pétrole	1 129.16	1 809.5	2 879.8	4 105.41
27 Cellulose et synthétiques	209.48	317.73	162.78	181.68
28 Industrie du caoutchouc	283.65	365.17	641.7	821.14
29 Industries divers	1 288.24	1 632.23	2 066.63	2 614.36
TOTAL	**47 867,9**	**64 650,43**	**47 505,3**	**59 924,81**

Key: A--Imports; B--Exports; I--Primary sector products; II--Extraction industry products; III--Manufacturing industry products; 1--Animal husbandry; 2--Forestry; 3--Hunting and fishing; 4--Metallic minerals; 5--Nonmetallic minerals; 6--Products for human nutrition; 7--Products not intended for human nutrition; 8--Beverage industries; 9--Tobacco industries; 10--Hides and skins industries; 11--Textile industry; 12--Clothing industry; 13--lumber and cork industry; 14--Nonprinted paper industry; 15--Printed [Continued on following page]

[Key to table continued from preceding page]
15--Printed paper industry; 16--Photo, motion picture industry; 17--Metallurgical industry; 18--Machine-building industry; 19--Including; 20--Precision instruments; 21--Vehicles; 22--Miscellaneous; 23--Nonmetallic minerals processing industry (except petroleum); 24--Chemical and derivatives industry; 25--Basic chemicals; 26--Petroleum distillation; 27--Cellulose and synthetics; 28--Rubber industry; 29--Miscellaneous industries.



IT-AF-B. Italy's Principal Suppliers and Customers, 1979.
Key: A--Suppliers; B--Customers; C--Billions of Lire; 1--South Africa; 2--Ivory Coast; 3--Morocco; 4--The Sudan.

Trade with Africa

Regarding more particularly the African countries, which are the essential subject of this article, it must be noted that the year 1979 was definitely favorable to them since the surplus of their sales to Italy, compared to the purchases they made in that country, came to 40.3 percent as against up 10.34 percent in 1978, up 4.60 percent in 1977, and up 35.74 percent in 1976.

Italian statistics divide Africa into three zones: North Africa (extending from the Canary Islands to the Sudan); West Africa (from Mauritania to Nigeria, and including Chad), and the rest of Africa. We note the strongest flow of commerce with North Africa (eight countries). Next comes the "rest of Africa" (32 countries listed, including South Africa) and, finally, West Africa with 17 countries shown.

He is the breakdown of transactions for 1978 to 1979 (in percentages of values involved):

	Imports		Exports	
	1978	1979	1978	1979
North Africa	60.10	57.70	63.35	70.99
West Africa	11.03	12.81	19.08	12.81
Rest of Africa	28.87	29.49	17.37	16.20

We find that Italian sales to Africa between 1978 and 1979 went up only 16.7 percent (in terms of current values), whereas Italian purchases from that continent grew 48.39 percent. This boom in purchases involves the majority of African countries but especially Libya, a big petroleum supplier (1,455.2 billion lire in 1978; 2,144.5 billion lire in 1979) and South Africa, a supplier of precious metals (901.9 and 1,393.8 billion lire).

It must be noted that imbalance in trade between Italy and South Africa is enormous to the benefit of the latter country (billions of lire);

	SA sales to Italy	SA purchases from Italy	Coverage for SA
1978	901.9	265.54	339.6 %
1979	1,393.77	268.24	519.6 %

Trade with Libya, whose supplies are confined to hydrocarbons, is much better compensated (131.5 percent in 1978; 134.2 percent in 1979).

Imports

Mostly Petroleum

Table IT-AF-4 classifies Italy's first 25 African supplier countries in 1979 and shows comparative figures for 1978, 1977, and 1976 for those same countries. Three countries stood out in 1979: Libya, South Africa, and Egypt, and eight countries topped or reached the 100-billion lire mark: Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Congo, Morocco, Zambia, and Zaire. We furthermore note four rather respectable suppliers: the Sudan, Cameroon, Liberia, and Kenya. Italian purchases from other countries are mediocre or small.

IT-AF-4. Trade between Africa and Italy--Italy's First 25 African Suppliers (1979 Base Year) (Billions of Lire)

	1979	1978	1977	1976
	–	–	–	–
1) Libya	2 144.46	1 455,22	1 341,17	1 389,08
2) Afrique du Sud ..	1 393,78	901,91	737,86	575,18
3) Égypt	894,54	635,53	369,04	317,35
4) Algéria........	439,74	394,40	172,77	257,37
5) Nigeria	380,52	132,93	93,04	48,52
6) Tunisia	342,64	172,47	166,54	146,52
7) Côte d'Ivoire ...	308,36	218,21	260,61	168,74
8) Congo	110,71	34,48	53,47	26,68
9) Maroc	107,98	82,31	85,93	84,65
10) Zambia.........	107.18	60,56	76,85	80,3
11) Zaïre	98.83	113,12	141.16	100.3
12) Soudan	85.73	77,75	70,99	70,84
13) Cameroun	76,61	64,49	59,63	40,26
14) Liberia	71,54	59,63	65,63	67,64
15) Kenya	62,92	38,86	29,27	26,82
16) Éthiopia.......	38,81	19,13	19,5	18.99
17) Mauritania	32,92	22,90	23,9	22.09
18) Tanzania ...	29,95	25,13	28,13	24,59
19) Guinée	28,61	33,97	20,4	13,79
20) Ouganda	24,75	10,34	17,63	17,11
21) Somalia.......	24,18	12,55	16,56	13,36
22) Sénégal	19,77	8,67	29,72	21,67
23) Gabon	18,03	30,44	24	14,21
24) Ghana	17,73	20,62	23,81	19,78
25) Madagascar	12,61	11,05	9,38	14,42

Key: 2--South Africa; 7--Ivory Coast; 9--Morocco; 12--The Sudan; 13--Cameroon; 20--Uganda.

If we calculate the increase in the volume of transactions between 1976 and 1979 within the range of the first five suppliers, we find that Nigeria very definitely dominates with a rate of increase of 684.3 percent, followed by Egypt (up 181.9 percent), South Africa (up 142.3 percent), Algeria (up 70.9 percent), and Libya (up 54.4 percent). It must however be noted that Nigeria is only in fifth place in this order of rank and that the figure of 684.3 percent springs from a base value of 48.52 billions in 1976, whereas the 181.9 percent figure for Egypt applies to a base figure of 317.35 billions and the 142.3 percent figure for South Africa is matched up with 575.2 billions.

Table IT-AF-3 shows the distribution of trade between Italy and the rest of the world broken down by commodity categories. Looking at imports we note the following breakdown for the year 1979:

Worldwide	
Purchases of raw products from primary sector	10.4%
Purchases of extraction industry products	24.1%
Purchases of manufacturing industry products	65.5%

Looking at purchases from Africa, the three categories of products given above are broken down as follows:

Africa	
Primary sector products	12%
Extraction industry products	59.4%
Manufacturing industry products	28.6%

Here, in decreasing order in terms of value (billions of lire) are the main Italian imports coming from Africa in 1979:

(1) Crude petroleum oils: 3,718 billions (3,056,418 tons). The chief suppliers were Libya (1,520,518 tons for 1,932.25 millions), Egypt (708,547 tons for 792.85 millions), Algeria (323,524 tons for 398.16 millions), Nigeria (278,640 tons for 328.65 millions), Tunisia (133,817 tons for 171.95 millions), Congo (89,309 tons for 93.84 millions). Petroleum purchases thus by themselves accounted for 53.42 percent of Italy's total imports from Africa.

(2) Precious metals: gold, silver, platinum: 957 billion lire. The purchases were made exclusively in South Africa.

(3) Coffee: 264.5 billion lire (87,093 tons), broken down as follows in terms of tonnages: Zaire (22,267 tons), Ivory Coast (18,627), Cameroon (14,186), Uganda (8,413), Kenya (6,644), Tanzania (5,907), Ethiopia (4,044), Madagascar (2,731), CAR (1,492), Congo (1,362), Burundi (690), Togo (290), Rwanda (263), Gabon (108), and Angola (69).

(4) Minerals or nonmetallic minerals other than petroleum: 249 billion lire (3,002,598 tons), including: coal (233,690 tons, South Africa); marine salt (76,543 tons, Tunisia); marble and similar products (3,703 tons, Morocco and Tunesia); sulfur (2,500 tons, Algeria); miscellaneous minerals (2,686,160 tons of miscellaneous products, including phosphates coming from Libya (1,711,650 tons worth 106.83 million); Morocco (675,941 tons worth 27 millions); South Africa (232,484 tons worth 69.55 millions); Togo (117,909 tons worth 5.24 millions), etc.

(5) Lumber: 183 billion lire (1,007,563 tons) including primarily in terms of tonnages: Ivory Coast (775,111 tons), South Africa (44,039), Congo (36,903), Ghana (35,740), Cameroon (33,371), Gabon (27,376), Morocco (18,656), Equatorial Guinea (12,310), Liberia (11,930), etc.

(6) Miscellaneous metallic minerals: 168 billion lire (7,509,355 tons), including iron minerals (6,558,931 tons, with 3,154,935 tons from Liberia, 1,790,942 tons from Mauritania, 1,327,832 tons from South Africa, and 285,322 tons from Algeria).

(7) Petroleum or oil distillation products: 165 billion lire (886,227 tons): Libya (379,893 tons), Egypt (223,207), Kenya (105,612), Algeria (68,368), Tunisia (42,723), Tanzania (15,517), etc.

(8) Copper and alloys: 143 billion lire (89,656 tons). Countries of origin with tonnages: Zambia (63,146 tons), Zaire (15,584), South Africa (10,572), Tanzania (150), etc.

(9) Metals other than precious metals and copper: 140.5 billion lire (303,158 tons), including lead and its alloys (42,491 tons; 42.86 millions) coming from South Africa (16,234 tons; 16.13 millions), from Morocco (11,566 tons; 11.49 millions), from Tunisia (8,671 tons; 9.06 millions), from Zambia (4,170 tons; 4.18 millions), from Algeria (1,800 tons; 2 millions), and from Zaire (445 tons); ferrous products (billets, ingots, sheets, etc.) (232,427 tons; 72 millions) mostly of South African origin (170,503 tons; 57.7 millions); nickel (3,608 tons; 15.53 millions), mostly from South Africa; and aluminum from Egypt (4,431 tons; 5.02 millions) and Cameroon (150 tons).

(10) Raw hides and skins: 140 billion lire (57,457 tons) coming primarily from South Africa (30,895 tons), Kenya (5,192), Ethiopia (5,083), Mozambique (3,762), Botswana (3,140), Somalia (1,541), Nigeria (1,239), Libya (1,058), Senegal (913), Cameroon (681), Upper Volta (639), Mali (626), Rwanda (536), the Sudan (513), etc.

(11) Edible oils: 113 billion lire (107,747 tons). Out of this total we have 64,209 tons of olive oil coming from Tunisia (62,484 tons; 71.78 millions), from Morocco (1,552 tons; 1.53 millions), and from Algeria (173 tons) plus 43,538 tons of miscellaneous oils, coming from the Sudan (15,447 tons; 16.99 millions), from Senegal (9,782 tons; 9 millions),

from Ivory Coast (9,643 tons); 6.56 millions, from Cameroon (1,817 tons), from Mauritania (1,637 tons), from Benin (1,538 tons), from Gambia (1,340 tons), from Zaire (1,190 tons), and from South Africa (1,144 tons).

(12) Raw cotton: 160 billion lire (59,735 tons). Countries of origin: the Sudan (31,543 tons; 57.9 millions), South Africa (14,252 tons; 20.49 millions), Egypt (8,676 tons; 20.68 millions), Tanzania (945 tons), Cameroon (886 tons), Ivory Coast (860 tons), Chad (694 tons), Nigeria (632 tons), Upper Volta (500 tons), Morocco (466 tons), etc.

(13) Raw Cocoa: 97 billion lire (14,258 tons). Countries of origin: Ivory Coast (16,688 tons; 53.61 millions), Nigeria (6,930 tons; 21.96 millions), Ghana (2,859 tons; 8.55 millions), Benin (2,271 tons; 6.56 millions), Cameroon (607 tons), Gabon (606 tons), Sao Tome (306 tons), Zaire (279 tons), etc.

(14) Miscellaneous chemical products: 94 billion lire (627,728 tons) including 115,592 tons of fertilizer from Tunisia (100,648 tons), from Egypt (9,324 tons), and from Morocco (5,575 tons). The other products come primarily from Libya (121,332 tons), from Tunisia (120,634 tons), from Guinea (114,408 tons), and from Algeria (45,519 tons).

The 14 product categories cover 94 percent of African imports by Italy or 6,538 billion lire out of 6,959.5. The other miscellaneous major imports were as follows in 1979 (in billions of lire):

Fresh or dried vegetables or fruits (54);
Fresh or frozen seafood products (45);
Textiles (except for clothing) (44);
Forest products other than timber (20.5);
Raw wool (19.5);
Oil-crop fruits or grains (15);
Sugar and derivatives (15);
Clothing (13.5);
Canned fruit (10);
Canned meat or fish (8);
Vegetable fibers other than cotton (6.5);
And 170.5 billion in highly varied or undetermined purchases.

Exports

Industrial Products: 99 Percent

Eight of Italy's first African customers also show up in the list of its first-ranking suppliers. They are Libya, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Ivory Coast. Two preferred suppliers--the Congo and Zambia--hold a rather modest position (20th and 23rd places) among Italy's customers whereas two of the outstanding customers (Somalia and the Canary Islands) are in a very mediocre position or not even mentioned among the first 25 suppliers (see Table IT-AF-5).

IT-AF-5. Italian-African Trade--Italy's First Five African Customers (1979 Base Year) (Billions of Lire)

	1979	1978	1977	1976
	–	–	–	–
1) Libya	1 597.87	1 106.83	1 081.04	843.68
2) Algéria	892.57	804.15	579.17	359.43
3) Égypt	431.34	345.6	300.18	249.63
4) Nigeria	381.82	557.18	524.23	280.74
5) Tunisia	281,36	167.69	163.86	110.41
6) Afrique du Sud	268,24	265.54	233.23	226.61
7) Maroc	216,86	181.93	185.95	118.36
8) Somalia	112,35	79.57	64.72	26.51
9) Côte d'Ivoire	75,17	73.76	49.89	36.72
10) Canaries	59.86	37.97	31.69	27.41
11) Kenya	57.99	68.13	48.34	24.6
12) Éthiopia	53,56	57.61	43.41	24.92
13) Cameroon	52,55	35.64	34.42	20.89
14) Sénégal	41,25	31.03	35.22	23.32
15) Soudan	37,38	50.66	63.82	56.88
16) Angola	37,17	24.36	17.41	15.04
17) Zaïre	34.48	46.81	51.94	29.34
18) Tanzania	33,22	48.26	28.04	10.18
19) Ghana	32,58	50.15	33.77	25.75
20) Congo	31.13	7	19.84	19.19
21) Liberia	28.28	26.42	40.42	21.43
22) Bénin	24,89	20.34	7.44	2.54
23) Zambia	23.94	25.84	24.77	28.15
24) Madagascar	22,79	4.94	9.89	8.07
25) Réunion	22,69	14.35	10.27	9.95

Key: 6--South Africa; 7--Morocco; 9--Ivory Coast; 10--Canary Islands; 15--The Sudan.

Italy's international exports are broken down as follows in percentages of values as of 1979:

Primary sector products	3.26%
Extraction industries products	0.27%
Manufacturing industries products	96.47%

Thus we see that Italy exports an overwhelming majority of industrial products abroad.

Looking at trade with Africa, the percentages are even more definite:

Primary sector products	0.76%
Extraction industry products	0.35%
Manufacturing industry products	98.89%

Indeed, sales by Italy to Africa practically cover all capital goods or consumer goods industry products.

The distribution of exports by main product categories, shown in Table IF-AF-6, enables us to note that about 4,215 billion lire (85 percent) of the exports evidently or probably involve needs going beyond pure consumption and extending into the field of capital goods. It is quite normal for the first two items to involve industrial machinery and transportation equipment and for petroleum derivatives to show up in a strong third place.

The readers will not be surprised to find that, in listing--for each category of specific commodities--Italy's African customers, we automatically run into the same names, whereas under the heading of imports there was a little more variety. These are the names of the most heavily populated, the most industrialized, or the richest countries (talking in terms of petroleum or agriculture): Libya, Algeria, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, etc., or those which, in the past (except for Libya) had particular links with Italy, such as Somalia, Tunisia, Ethiopia, for example.

Getting back to Italy's first export item going to Africa, that is, nonelectrical machinery (essentially covered under Chapter 84 of the Brussels commodity list), the precise breakdown of purchases by categories is rather difficult and we find a large volume of transactions under the heading "miscellaneous nonelectrical machinery and apparatus," covering purchases of equipment which are difficult to categorize.

However, several types of specific equipment items hold an outstanding position, especially machine-tools (75.44 billion lire) which are very much in demand in Algeria, South Africa, and Egypt; industrial motors (55.64 millions), purchased especially by Algeria and Libya; mineral extraction and processing machines (79.02 millions) going to Libya, Algeria, Egypt, and Nigeria; textile industry machinery (42.20 millions) purchased especially by Algeria; and finally agricultural machinery (32.52 millions).

The best customers for all Italian nonelectrical machinery are: Algeria (227.26 millions), Libya (184.17 millions), Egypt (71.73 millions), South Africa (71.19 millions), Nigeria (65.73 millions), Tunisia (94.45 millions), and Morocco (47.88 millions).

We find roughly the same big buyers for electrical equipment (apparatuses: 26.94 billions; components, accessories, parts: 48.21 billions). Thus, exports of generators and turning machines (64.27 millions) particularly involve Libya (18.27), Nigeria (10.92), Algeria (9.29), Morocco (7.82), and Egypt (4.64). There is an enormous market for telecommunications equipment (68.20 millions) with 24.04 millions going to Nigeria and a rather appreciable clientele in Libya (8.86), Somalia (8), South Africa (6.54), Egypt (4.94), and Morocco (4.66). The five best customers for miscellaneous electrical equipment (128.47 millions) were Libya (37.2), Algeria (27.93), Egypt (17.55), South Africa (11.33), and Nigeria (10.30), with Morocco (5.64) and Tunisia (5.28) however also constituting rather respectable customers here. All of these countries, except for South Africa, in the case of wires and cables, get most of the Italian exports of wiring articles and accessories (conductors, disconnection equipment, insulators, lamps, etc.).

Exports of transportation equipment (726.35 millions) consist of 78 percent highway equipment (566.35 millions). Next we have aviation equipment (98.88 millions; 13.6 percent), maritime or river equipment (56.70 millions; 7.8 percent), and railroad equipment (4.42 millions; negligible share).

The highway equipment market essentially consists of tourist or utility vehicles, tractors and, of course, spare parts used for the maintenance of this motor pool. Table IT-AF-7 provides details on sales of automotive vehicles ("autoveicoli") (44,151 units) and tractors (4,509 units). It is therefore useless to come back to that here. Spare parts (176.98 millions) constitute a rather harmoniously distributed market. The biggest purchases are registered in Libya (39.84 millions), in Algeria (28.33), in Egypt (19.56), in South Africa (17.25), in Nigeria (16.65), in Somalia (9.49), and in Tunisia (6.71).

IT-AF-7. Italian Automotive Vehicle Exports to Africa in 1979 (in Units N and in Billions of Lire V)

A). Voitures automobiles (y compris camions)	N	V	B) Tracteurs	N	V
	–	–		–	–
Total	**44 151**	**301,06**	**Total**	**4 509**	**66,58**
C dont :			C dont :		
Égypt	10 760	30,85	2 Afrique du sud	1 409	8.85
1 Maroc	7 217	18,74	Nigeria	913	21,39
Libya	7 200	120,64	Libya	586	12,6
2 Afrique du Sud	4 688	11,11	Tunisia	307	4,38
3 Iles Canaries	2 417	9,42	Kenya	306	2,63
Algéria	2 187	30,51	4 Côte d'Ivoire	142	1,79
Tunisia	1 643	11,84	Égypt	134	1,09
Somalia	1 582	20,12	Somalia	117	4,16
Zambia	856	3,46	Algéria	75	1,92
Kenya	779	3,11	Gambia	74	0,34
4 Côte d'Ivoire	757	2,44	Éthiopia	60	0,59
Nigeria	517	7,53	Mali	59	0,50
Réunion	474	1,65	Réunion	57	0,51
Sénégal	434	1,43	1 Maroc	34	2,47
Éthiopia	399	7,44	3 Canaries	30	0,54
Ghana	390	1,26			
D Autres	1 851	19,50	D Autres	206	14,16

Key: A--Automotive vehicles (including trucks); B--Tractors; C--Including; D--Miscellaneous; 1--Morocco; 2--South Africa; 3--Canary Islands; 4--Ivory Coast.

Aviation equipment (98.88 millions) particularly involved four countries: Libya (51.97 millions), Morocco (26.97), Zaire (7.99), and Zambia (5.12). Maritime or river equipment (56.7 millions) primarily went to Libya (24.22 millions), Liberia (13.51), and Ghana (11.69).

Metallurgical products (38.78 millions), especially "sheet metal," were purchased to the extent of 92.3 percent (356.18 millions) by the following seven countries: Libya (152.61), Algeria (55.72), Tunisia (44.46), Egypt (44.40), Nigeria (25.73), Morocco (20.40), and South Africa (12.86).

Exports of industrial products or metal used for mechanical applications (502.59 millions) for the most part are rather vaguely determined (Chapters 82 and 83 of the NdB [Brussels Commodity List]). Here we note two huge customers: Libya (227.70 millions) and Algeria (107.65 millions).

Refined petroleum products exports (487.63 millions) almost exclusively go to North Africa and West Africa. Gas-oil and fuels are most frequently sold here. The chief customers for all of the products derived from distillation are Libya (128.34 millions), Algeria (106.62), Tunisia (57.54), Nigeria (53.28), Egypt (35.67), Congo (20.62), and Cameroon (11.99).

Chemical products exports (for specific categories, please see table) especially involve products intended for the plastics industry (125 millions out of a total of 347.28 millions in exports). Next we have pharmaceutical products (34.79 millions), paints and varnishes (16.92); fertilizer (16.16); hygiene products (14.95); and disinfectants (10.78). The eight principal customers are Algeria (67.14 millions), Egypt (59.30), Libya (50.84), South Africa (35.50), Nigeria (29.06), Tunisia (23.71), Kenya (17.49), and Morocco (16.25).

Looking at food industry products exports (250.96 millions), there are three outstanding categories: flour (133.33 millions), canned tomatoes (33.06), and hulled rice (23.96). Here we run almost always into the usual customers. Looking at flour, we have Algeria (91.10 millions) and Libya (18.51); for rice, we have Libya (9.09) and la Reunion (7.50); for canned tomatoes, we have Ivory Coast (6.85), Senegal (6.31), Benin (2.88), Cameroon (2.82), and Nigeria (2.67); for olive oil, we have Libya (5.35) and Nigeria (3.36); for meat and canned meat there are Libya (4.55) and Algeria (4.42); for fish, there is Libya (4.08); for sugar and confectionary items there is Libya (6.20); for canned fruits, likewise Libya (6.29); for canned vegetables, again Libya (3.60), etc.

This listing is becoming rather monotonous now. But we must continue it with another four or five categories of goods for which our examination will be more schematic (total exports, in billions of lire, and the three biggest customers, if there are three):

Nonmetallic minteral processing (199.96 millions),
Ceramic products (66.11): Libya (28.86), Egypt (8.42), Canary Islands (4.64),

Glass and similar items (40.33): Libya (17.37), Algeria (8.06), Egypt (5.40),
Lime and cement (33.81): Libya (11.88), Nigeria (8), Algeria (7.22)
Chinaware, porcelain (25.58): Libya (11.41), Egypt (5.45), Algeria (2.45),
Marble, etc. (13.36): Libya (8.87), Egypt (1.79), Canary Islands (0.67).
Miscellaneous (stone, etc.) (20.77): Libya (6.25), South Africa (3.47), Algeria (3.39).

Lumber industry products (158.24 millions), including cut lumber (17.58): Libya (10.71), Algeria (3.92), Egypt (1.18); furniture (104.81): Libya (83.72), Egypt (6.49), Algeria (3.37); miscellaneous (35.85): Libya (16.59), Algeria (5.75), Nigeria (3.30).

Textile industry products (with the exception of clothing and shoes) (123.50 millions) including Libya (26.22), South Africa (19.17), Algeria (16.72), Tunisia (15.97), Egypt (10.52).

Clothing and shoe industry products (131.28 millions) including clothing (55.92): Libya (36.20), Benin (4.93), Egypt (3.73); shoes (56.80): Libya (21.93), Nigeria (6.24), Ivory Coast (6.03).

Miscellaneous categories. Measurement and precision instruments (46.78): Libya (16.08), Algeria (8.11), Egypt (5.47). Office equipment (35.24): South Africa (11.53), Algeria (6.24), Libya (4.23); unprinted paper (44.09): Libya (13.46), Algeria (9.96), Egypt (5.77).

It emerges from this study which, in spite of the accumulation of statistics, remains very summary, that Italy's trade with the African countries is favorably oriented. That trade however consists of 53.5 percent imports involving purchases of crude petroleum coming essentially from North Africa and, to the overwhelming extent, from Libya. To those 53.5 percent we must add 13.7 percent consisting of the 952 billion lire in purchases of gold, silver, and platinum from South Africa. That leaves us 32.8 percent (2,290 billion) for the purchase of conventional tropical products (coffee, cocoa, cotton, etc.).

It must be noted furthermore that Italy's customers in Africa, as of 1979, were represented to the extent of 72.3 percent (3,585 billions) by the five countries which supply it with petroleum, that is, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and Tunisia.

We also find that exports, exclusively industrial, which is entirely normal, for the most part involve products coming from the heavy or medium industries. We can see that two-thirds (3,260 billions) of sales involve machines, vehicles, metallurgical, machine-building, and petroleum distillation products.

These considerations do not prevent the advance in the overall total of transactions involved: 6,300 billion lire in 1976, 7,748 in 1977, 9,042 in 1978, and 11,920 in 1980; Italy however could try to vary primarily its trade in both directions and, regarding exports, could try to promote the production of some of its light industries (lumber, textiles, and food).

IT-AF-6. Distribution of Italian Exports to Africa in 1979, in Terms of Value (Billions of Lire)

Total exports	4,960.34
Nonelectrical machinery	848.27
Machine-tools for metals	36.70
Miscellaneous machine-tools	37.74
Nonelectrical moving machines	55.64
Agricultural machinery and apparatus	32.52
Mineral processing machines	79.02
Textile and clothing machines	42.20
Paper and cardboard machines	3.01
Graphic industries machines	2.75
Food industry machines	19.49
Roller bearings	3.67
Miscellaneous nonelectrical machinery and apparatus	369.71
Parts for these equipment items	165.82
Transportation equipment	726.35
Bicycles and parts	7.88
Motor cycles and parts	13.35
Four-wheel vehicles (passenger cars, trucks)	301.58
Tractors	66.56
Parts for "four-wheel vehicles"	176.98
Railroad equipment and parts	4.42
Aviation equipment and parts	98.88
Floating equipment and parts	56.70
Miscellaneous products of metallurgical and machine-building industries	502.59
Billets, pig iron	3.63
Agricultural and crafts tools	16.95
Hardware	11.59
Undetermined items	470.42
Petroleum and coal distillation derivatives	487.63
Light oils	116.94
Standard oils	76.18
Gas-oil and fuel	129.19
Lamp oil	76.31
Lubricants and heavy oils	40.86
Miscellaneous derivatives	35.37
Coke	11.99
Coal derivatives	0.79

Metallurgical products	385.78
Products for plastics industry	125
Pharmaceutical products	34.79
Dyeing products	16.92
Chemical fertilizer	16.16
Soaps, detergents, etc.	14.95
Plant-health, disinfectants	10.78
Synthetic rubber	6.38
Glues and inks	6.33
Explosives, matches	3.82
Perfume products	3.50
Miscellaneous inorganic products	28.90
Miscellaneous organic products	18.26
Undetermined	61.49
Electrical Equipment and apparatus	309.15
Generators and part	64.27
Telecommunications equipment and parts	68.20
Electrical wires and cables	28.03
Electrical lamps	20.18
Miscellaneous apparatus and parts	128.47
Food and Semi-Food Industry Products	250.91
Hulled rice	23.96
Flour and derivatives	133.33
Canned tomatoes	33.06
Miscellaneous canned vegetables	3.98
Canned fruits	7.47
Olive oil	9.24
Miscellaneous edible oils	3.86
Sugar and derivatives	9.64
Fresh or prepared meat	12.95
Fresh or prepared fish	5.36
Butter and cheese	1.43
Miscellaneous	1.34
Beverages	5.10
Prepared tobacco	0.06
Nonmetallic mineral processing products (except for oil and coal)	199.96
Ceramic products	66.11
Lime, cement	33.81
Glass and crystal	40.33
Chinaware and porcelain	25.58
Marble and similar items	13.36
Miscellaneous	20.77
Lumber industry products	158.24
Cut lumber	10.62
Compensated wood	6.96

Furniture wood	104.81
Miscellaneous processed wood	35.85
Clothing and shoe industry products	131.28
Fabric or mesh clothing	55.92
Hats	3.77
Gloves	0.27
Leather shoes	32.03
Miscellaneous shoewear	24.77
Miscellaneous (buttons, umbrellas, etc.)	14.52
Textile articles	123.50
Miscellaneous threads (Including synthetics: 26.37)	40.45
Miscellaneous fabrics (Including synthetics; 28.37)	43.15
Mesh materials (Including synthetics: 11.60)	21.29
Special fabrics	6.07
Miscellaneous	12.54
Watches, clocks, and precision instruments	83.49
Office equipment	35.24
Precision instruments	46.78
Watches, clocks	1.47
Rubber industry products	55.59
Miscellaneous specific products	324.78
Unprinted paper	44.09
Raw agricultural products including fruits (16.64) and cereals (3.80)	31.51
Printed paper	15.90
Nonmetallic minerals	13.34
Prepared hides and skins	8.25
Cellulose-containing textile products	7.51
Livestock products	4.77
Metallic minerals	4.10
Miscellaneous products	195.31
Undetermined products	25.54

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ZAIRIAN-GUINEAN COOPERATION AGREEMENTS--The joint Zairian-Guinean committee's work, which took place last 26 to 30 September in Kinshasa, resulted in the conclusion of several agreements covering every area of cooperation. It involves the following texts, signed on 30 September: friendship and cooperation treaty, trade agreement, agreement on telecommunication matters, agreement on air transportation (the agreement on maritime transportation is still under study), judicial compact, agreement on cultural, scientific and social cooperation, a sports-agreement draft. The two parties have likewise studied the possibilities of cooperation in the fields of energy and bauxite. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2684] 8870

CSO: 4400

ANGOLA

NEW PETROLEUM SCHOOL COURSES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS IN French 31 Oct 80 p 2693

[Report: "New Course Offered At the Central Petroleum School in N'Gunza"]

[Text] The Central Petroleum School was opened in the city N'Gunza in 1979 which was decreed the "cadre training year" in Angola. Its purpose is to supply the country with national technical cadres needed by this industrial sector.

The school has classrooms, laboratories, offices, cafeterias, kitchens, dormitories for students and faculty, a printing center, a library and a laundry room. It has independent electric and water supplies and transport facilities.

In the course of the first 9 months following its inauguration it was organized on the basis of a minimum structure allowing for good operations. Four pilot courses were offered on the following subjects: production technicians, electricians, refinery technicians, and laboratory technicians. The facilities, installations, and organizational systems of the school were tested. During that period the school operated at two-thirds capacity. The decision has now been made to run it at full capacity.

The Ministry of Petroleum, therefore, accepted students enrolling in two new courses: production technicians (second year) and maintenance mechanics (first year). The candidates will be informed later of the date of the entrance examination.

The Central Petroleum School will be a boarding school. The students will be housed, fed, and clothed. They will be paid 3,000 kwanzas monthly; they will receive basic practical and theoretical training. They will then undergo a period of practical training whose length will be based on the selected skill. In the course of such training they will be paid 8,000 kwanzas monthly.

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CSO: 4400

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

NATIONALIZATIONS ANNOUNCED--Five enterprises were confiscated from their owners who had abandoned them by leaving Angola. The decision, made in Luanda by the Council of Ministers, applied to the following companies: Sociedade Angolana de Detergentes (Sodete), Empresa Individual de Antonio Patrocinio, Sociedade Tecnica Radio-Electronica (Stereo), and Serralheria Angola, all of them in Huambo, and Sociedade Reckitt e Colman in Luanda. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2693] 5157

CSO: 4400

BENIN

COUNTRY UNABLE TO COPE WITH HOUSING SHORTAGE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2676

[Text] The housing shortage has severely hit Benin. There is, however, no solution in sight to this problem which is gradually growing worse month by month. However, everything was going well until soon after President Kerekou's government came into power 26 October 1972. At Cotonou, for example, the Al 'Hadj and the "comrades" living abroad began to build a little here and there as well as in Benin's main towns.

Later, with the government's adoption of radical reforms, the proclamation of Marxist-Leninism, the euphemistically baptized nationalized industries' takeover, the precipitate seizure from the condemned and voluntary expatriates the property which they could have invested in housing, all forestalled their endeavors. Even people in humble circumstances in the working class districts have no longer dared to build.

Statements issued by the head of state, the minister of defense, have succeeded in worsening the situation as they threatened owners who would increase rents "by speculating on the present transitory housing shortage." In view of these officials statements, which the minister of the interior at the time took up again, they froze the rents at their 1979 price. The owner's reaction was totally unexpected: despite the building freeze, the refusal to rent even new housing, not to mention the Beninese tendency to cheat, even among the most revolutionary, the general impression was that these official statements had produced the desired results; to expedite speculation on rentals in due time.

It was generally believed that with these measures taken by the government, the latter was going to take the necessary steps to make up for the lack of competent personnel in the housing sector. As a matter of fact, within the framework of the campaign for national construction, it was generally believed that the state was going to put up some housing structures.

Moreover, in the Public Works Department, which meanwhile became the Ministry of Equipment (as this mission was never accomplished, it again became the Ministry of Public Works, Building and Housing), there is frequently talk of a program to build 1,000 housing facilities, at other times, 10,000 housing facilities: the uninitiated do not always know how they are going to carry out this celebrated program about whose subject matter and consistence the TP [Public Works] technicians are competely uninformed.

Even if they do succeed in accomplishing this, the financiers have not had their say about such an ambitious project which will require human, technical and financial resources which the country, as far as we know, apparently does not have. The project is even more especially ambitious, as we learned at Cotonou, where the Beninese Bank of Development in conjunction with the French Republic Aid and Cooperation Fund and the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation is engaged in a social and economic housing project in Cotonou. As political authorities interfered in it and even unlawfully ousted those in charge of the bank, the project has come to a standstill and the assignment of housing is apparently still a long way off.

Even the very project originating within the framework of the revised version of the cooperation agreements with France is not getting off the ground: Benin with France's help was to build some houses first and foremost for French technical assistants. Since 1975, no one has the least idea how the matter stands in so far as beginning the project is concerned.

The housing shortage has reached the point that some countries or organizations which cooperate with Benin in the technical assistance area are limiting the arrival of specialists to the availability of housing. Diplomatic circles in Cotonou are saying that some of their coworkers have stayed in hotels for as long as a year or more.

In short, the state has deterred the endeavors of private individuals without being able to assure any relief on its own part, even though it has succeeded in establishing the National Realty Administration Company (SONAGIM) and the National Building and Public Works Company (SONACOTRAP).

Despite all its good will, the Beninese Government has not succeeded in coming to grips with the housing shortage. This is apparently based on the false premise that the private sector is incapable of making the people happy, especially within the Beninese context. As a matter of fact, a private organization could have pursued its activities in its own sector while the government, ever in full control, was preparing its simple, practical projects to oblige the private organization to lower its prices.

As a result of envisioning enormous programs which do not meet the needs of the country's 3.5 million inhabitants, everything is stagnating and actually bogged down. The Beninese revolutionaries are apparently not very familiar with pilot projects.

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CAPE VERDE

DETAILS OF FRENCH COOPERATION PROVIDED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2673

[Report by the Mixed Commission]

[Text] Inaugurating the proceedings of the Third Mixed French-Cape Verde Commission on 22 October in Paris, Robert Galley, French minister of cooperation, pointed out that Cape Verde, a country experiencing "extraordinary difficulties due to weather conditions," was "among the most deprived countries with most urgent needs" which would be given French priority support.

Jose Brito, Cape Verde minister of the plan and cooperation, emphasized in his answer the importance to his country of French aid which would be included in national planning.

In his 23 October press conference Pedro Pires pointed out that "positive results" had been achieved in the course of the meeting of the Mixed Commission, in the following areas: rural development, water and agricultural management, fishing, telecommunications, education, training and tourism.

Actually, French assistance to Cape Verde will be developed as follows:

Continued maritime buoyage of the archipelago (Boa Vista and Sao Antao). The "Sahel New Energies" program will follow its normal course with the construction of a second windmill pumping station in Sao Nicolau and further Comes activities (solar and wind power batteries, desalinization of sea water, and electrification of isolated centers with air generators).

In Sao Nicolau, an island where French assistance is greater (see MTM, 24 October 1980, p 2613), agricultural development will be pursued through the creation of irrigated areas, reforestation of pastureland, electrification of Ribeira Brava (the main city), and the study of the repair of telephone communications with other islands. Activities related to individual fishing and the training of construction workers by volunteers are contemplated as well.

The new cooperation activities will apply, particularly, to the development of tourism with the study of the feasibility for the construction of a 100-room hotel at Sal Airport (which could subsequently obtain a CCCE loan) and a general plan for the development of tourism (identification mission). The training of personnel for tourism and hotel work will be undertaken as well.

The air mapping of the archipelago, started in 1979, will be continued in accordance with the 1981-1985 plan (urban cartography of Praya and Mindelo on the 1:2000 scale). It will include research on marine resurgence of fresh water through the interpretation of infrared aerial photography.

The French Postal and Telecommunication Service will provide a ground telecommunications station (B standard) (cost: 11 million French francs). Its installation will be financed by the Aid and Cooperation Fund (3.3 million French francs). Its completion is scheduled for August 1981.

The study of the construction of refrigerated slaughterhouses for fresh and processed meat will be undertaken within the framework of a project for industrial breeding of poultry and hogs, eventually to be co-financed with Austria.

A decision was made to continue with scientific research (agronomy, sociology) and assign to Cape Verde a group of public works experts.

The study of the construction of a "polytechnical" school (higher education school and school of administration) will be undertaken and the building of a preparatory school in Santa Catarina will be completed in 1981. A reform of the teaching of French in Cape Verde will be undertaken and the CCCE could finance the building of housing for the technical training staff.

Finally, in addition to French aid in food products, bilateral cooperation will be applied also in the development of a nongovernmental body, the Cape Verde Solidarity Institute, for which France will open a kindergarten.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

EEC LOAN FOR RAILROAD--Cooperation between Congo and EEC was discussed between Claude Cheysson, European Commissioner responsible for the cooperation for development and Congolese officials, during a 3 day visit to Congo by Cheysson. Mr Cheysson, who left Brazzaville on 23 October for Kinshasa, signed a complementary financial agreement for the realignment of the Congo-Ocean Railroad (CFCO), with the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Nze. It's rumored in the congolese capital that the EEC is granting a loan of 840 million CFA francs to the Congolese Government and a nonrefundable aid of 1.18 thousand CFA francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2683] 9626

CSO: 4400

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

PRESIDENT DISCUSSES NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Jul 80 pp 54-55

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Teodoro Obiang, president of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and of the Supreme Military Council, by correspondent Manuel Hurtado; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] After a regrettably notorious dictatorial period, the young Republic of Equatorial Guinea has recovered its dignity and is embarking on the path of reconstruction. The latter is no easy task, since during many years the country lived in the greatest neglect. Not even the lands were cultivated, nor was there teaching in the schools, nor were homes or roads built--nothing at all. More than lethargy, it had to do with a genuinely inconceivable step backwards of which one man was the author--the deceased former president Macias, who according to all opinions, had lost his mind. Confronted with such a state of completely intolerable affairs, the Armed Forces of Equatorial Guinea (FAGE) ended up by reacting and, supported by the people, put an end to the regime which had filled them with shame and sadness.

At the head of the redemption movement was Lt Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, today the president of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and also president of the Supreme Military Council. We spoke with him.

DEFENSA: Mister President, what was the situation in Equatorial Guinea when the previous regime was overthrown?

President: Absolute chaos, shocking corruption, terrible injustice which reached into all areas, even to the last citizen, and which provoked a generalized discontent among the population. Here nothing remained: neither State, nor administration nor public services. Even the army had lost its true character and was replaced with militia that former president Macias used to repress the people and to impose his whim.

D: Since you mention the FAGE, were they seen to be much affected during this period?

P: Yes, enormously. By citing only one fact, I will tell you that a great part of the command positions were entrusted to ignorant, incapable individuals without the least training, whose sole merit consisted of their being members of the dictator's clique of worshippers. The promotions took place in a completely capricious way, and, in summary, as in all other facets of the regime of former president Macias, arbitrariness, violence and injustice reigned.

D: Within the national reconstruction plans, what has been planned for the FAGE?

P: The changes, of necessity, must be many and profound, ranging from the creation of combat units and an infrastructure that we need nowadays, to the provision of arms, equipment, etc, without forgetting moral and technical training. We have lost 11 years and now we must recover that time in a decisive way.

D: What are the most urgent needs of the FAGE?

P. I have already spoken of some of them. Others would be the air and sea resources to guard our territorial waters and to better unite the island territory with the continent. Also, we need a good ratio communications network, on the island as well as on the continent. And we need many other things, on which a very complete study is presently being done. We cannot forget, on this subject, another urgent objective: that of standardizing the criteria of our military authorities. Since some of them were trained in the Soviet Union, others in the PRC, others in Cuba, some in Vietnam, etc., they have different ideas which must be homogenized, giving them a unity of doctrine and form.

D: Equatorial Guinea is defined as a nonaligned country. What is meant by nonalignment, Mister President?

P: Fundamentally, we believe that our country does not have to let itself become involved in the struggles of the blocs, nor embrace foreign models. We wish to follow our own road, to respect and to be respected, and, finally, to accept only that which supports our development.

D: Do you consider foreign aid desirable, and, if so, under what conditions?

P: We have requested aid from all countries, specifying that we reject political conditions and any others that may represent the impairment of our interests or of our sovereignty. The truth is that we have made a general call for help to rebuild the country, but we have not seen too many positive reactions. In any event, numerous embassies are opening their doors, and we hope that it will result in an understanding of our situation and that we will awaken a solidarity abroad that nowadays is very limited.

D: Do you think that Spanish being the official language of Equatorial Guinea may mean a link to Spain and to the countries of Latin America?

P: Among the unpardonable errors of the previous regime was having imposed an alienation from Spain as well as from Spanish-speaking peoples throughout the world. We have corrected that mistake from the first day, in the clear awareness that we share, besides language, historical ties and common customs that are undeniable. As you know, the Supreme Military Council has given preference to dealings with Spain and, at the same time, we want--and within our limitations, we are advocating--a stronger relationship with the countries of Latin America.

We will not take more time from our illustrious speaker. We know that he finds himself engaged in an enormous task which would have discouraged many others, but Lieutenant Colonel Nguema is a tenacious, determined man who wishes to achieve in as little time as possible, some very ambitious goals--goals which would not be so far away if Equatorial Guinea, during more than a decade, had not lived with its back to reality, thanks to a sinister personality named Macais.

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GHANA

BRIEFS

UNEXPLOITED MINERALS--Speaking at a symposium on "The Ghanaian Economy and its Future," held last October in Acra, Dr R. P. Baffour, former candidate for the presidency of the republic who was defeated at the 18 June 1979 elections, stated that the future of his country lay in its subsoil which contains, he said, substantial quantitities of natural gas, iron ore, (340 million tons), cobalt, bauxite and other minerals, in the Western area in particular. Dr Baffour expressed his regret that all such deposits were not as yet being exploited. "We are sitting on millions," he pointed out, "while we remain hungry." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2679] 5157

CSO: 4400

GUINEA

DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 pp 3007-3010

[Article by Jacques Latremoliers]

[Excerpts] President Sekou Toure has aroused so many opposing feelings that after 22 years of Guinean independence he continues to play a role in our policy; however, the idea we in France have of his character is still a conditioning factor with respect not only to our contribution to Guinea's development but even to the estimation of its potential resources.

The regime and style of Sekou Toure's government are obviously rather far removed from what most Frenchmen understand by democracy. This induces many to have a moralizing attitude which is expressed all the more willingly because the country that brings it out in them continues to be a secondary partner. Justified or not, this attitude has not prevented the absence in Guinea of any organized opposition, except superficial opinion movements, particularly among women's groups. The only danger that a president who is still young and in full possession of his physical and intellectual faculties, could encounter would be a palace guard revolution; however, the method of reciprocal neutralization which he practices with regard to his colleagues would make the success of such an endeavor very difficult, as witnessed by the regular frustration and even the frequency of the intrigues thwarted in the past. Therefore, solidarity in the human sector appears to be the first objective fact.

Is liberalization of the regime another objective fact? This is still only faintly observable in the country's political and economic organization. The World Bank and the European Development Fund have brought about several breakthroughs in agriculture, by supporting programs of well-digging and irrigated rice cultivation. However, in spite of the tilt in the direction of this sector of 75 percent of the country squires [bacheliers], the distribution of cultivated lands among a traditional peasantry of self-subsistence and collectivist structures, PRL (Local Revolutionary Authorities) or state farms has not brought about any improvement in the percentage of agricultural products among exports (3 percent) nor reduction in imports of foodstuffs. With respect to retail trade, in the absence of opening the old shpps, we have noted the reappearance of the bana-bana, small sidewalk merchants. A test in the commercial or small industry sector would be the establishment of joint economy companies in which foreign capital could participate: we have found several initiatives of this kind in the fishing, quarries and oil exploration sectors. Such fragmentary or temporary efforts can hardly be considered to have economic significance.

Also, disregarding the mining sector where the association of the state and private capital, if not the rule, is at least the most generalized procedure, it would be premature to affirm the full-compatibility of Guinean and Western development methods.

On the other hand, in the foreign policy sector, the progressive convergence of objectives has now been attained. Three events characterize this evolution. In 1976, the appointment of Mr Lewin as French ambassador to Conakry was to trigger a French-Guinean reconciliation, which had been vainly attempted on several occasions by French personalities with diverse backgrounds.

The third objective fact was the reprimand administered to the USSR by Guinea in the Afghanistan affair, that confirms and accentuates the loosening of ties with its former ally, which had already been started by the renunciation of the fishing agreements and which will result in Guinea's rapproachement with us, or at least with authentic "nonalined countries."

The progressive reinsertion of Guinea in an African policy of cooperation with the West was demonstrated at the time of Djibouti's independence, at the meeting of the Committee of Wise Men [Sages] of the Western Sahara, at the Cuba conference, in the moderate position taken by President Sekou Toure in the Bokassa affair. Guinea's progressive reinsertion is reflected in the strengthening of the friendship which, since Mohamed V, has united the Guinean leader with the Moroccan monarchy; in the standing Moroccans have in Conakry; finally, in the joint visit to be made in the near future to the Pope, Mr Giscard d'Estaing and Mr Brezhnev by Hassan II and the presidents of the Guinean republic and Bangladesh, following the extraordinary conference of the Islamic countries which met in Rabat on 18 September.*

Cooperation: Its Financial Aspects in 1980

The implications of internal French policy for our relations with Guinea appear in this: President Giscard d'Estaing was at one and the same time and contradictorily reproached for "having been there" but not having taken advantage of the situation sufficiently. As for the very style of the trip, which according to some observers was characterized by excessive cordiality, one will note that it would not have been easy, with a subject like the Guinean prime minister, who maintained a discreet reserve, to seal a reconciliation, the way for which had been smoothed by our diplomatic representation.

The real problem is indeed the opportuneness of this reconciliation, vis-a-vis our interests in Guinea and their future but particularly as regards the difficulty for France of conducting a coherent African policy by pretending to ignore a country whose population, mineral reserves and agricultural resources. no matter what regime it may have tomorrow, give promise of a preeminent position in this geographical sector.

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* Within the framework of activities of the Al Qods Committee, p 3007

We do not see how the political positions of Sekou Toure, present and past, would justify such an impasse. Even if his successors are to be "further to the East," he would expose himself to bitter regrets at not having taken advantage of a relatively favorable conjuncture by contributing to the reinforcement of his new orientations. If this successors are to be "further to the West," they could only hold it against us for not having taken these orientations into consideration and could make us feel it by giving preference to others. Playing the game of impasse would also make a bargain of the efforts exerted by certain French firms since 1959 to occupy the terrain, by assuring the air service of Guinea from Europe, by maintaining without great profits bonded warehouses or commercial branches in Conakry and, finally, by negotiating difficult markets with European or international financing (renovation of the Sanoyah textile complex by the Ets Schaeffer).

The Brake on Indebtedness

One would be unable to soundly evaluate Guinea's chances without taking into consideration its financial and monetary situation, which, moreover, has an impact--as much as the personality of President Ahmed Sekou Toure--upon the sectional choices of development and the contributions of foreign capital permitting attainment of the objectives involved in agriculture, aluminum metallurgy or any other industry.

Guinea is a country with 5.7 million inhabitants; is as large as France; is to all intents and purposes wealthy because it has one-third of the world's potential reserves of high-yield bauxite (the production of the Boke mine makes it number two in the world); has a still unexploited iron deposit in Mount Nimba, which with the Carajas deposit in Brazil is one of the largest accumulations of hematite in the world (somewhat over 65 percent), without mentioning alluvial gold and diamonds whose reserves are stimated at 200 million carats, reasonable expectations in the oil and uraniferous minerals sector and, finally, an agricultural potential close to those which assured the fortune of the Ivory Coast.

However, Guinea is also a poor country, not so much because it has an annual budget deficit which could total one-third of announced revenues, but because its gross domestic product represents only 706 French francs per capita, one-fourth that of the Ivory Coast, and finally, because it is in debt owing to its investment efforts but also because of the food deficit and rises in the price of oil, with foreign public debt estimated at 4 billion francs and a ratio of debt service to export revenues of 27 percent.

This situation is aggravated by the permanent under par rating of the national monetary unit, the syli[2], which is often translated into chaotic management characterized, for a country whose average indebtedness with COFACE [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade] is evaluated at 600 million francs, by outstanding debts which could total 85 million francs and which explain in particular the delays noted in the release of the third tranche of the railway project.

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* 1 syli= 0.22 French francs

The moratorium agreed to this year in Paris, but not yet signed, between representatives of the Guinean Government and their French creditors, certainly is not negligible, as it resulted in the spreading out over 10 years, with a 4-year grace period and 8 percent interest, of the payment of debts which had come due.

It seems that the Guinean delegates wanted more generous terms for the spreading out of the indebtedness, up to 14 years, but above all their application, with respect to outstanding debts, to payments to be made resulting from contracts already signed. The future will tell whether the terms agreed to by the French Treasury will suffice to clean up the financial bases of French-Guinean cooperation, with account taken of the supplementary difficulties of exchange which make one wish, if not for a difficult-to-imagine insertion of the syli into the franc area, at least Fora certain contractual stabilization of the relationships between the two monies.

Pro and Con the Konkoure Dam

Guinea's present economic structures, because of their apparent insufficiency in the agricultural sector, because of the impetus given to mining extraction and the manufacture of alumina, which provide 97 percent of exports, are such that economic takeoff cannot be sought therein, within a reasonable time frame, except by exploiting bauxite ore through transformation into alumina and aluminum, indeed by devoting to other industrial or transport activities the possible surplus of electric energy which such explitation supposes. These objectives are today encompassed in a single project, that of the Konkoure Dam. The size of this project obviously makes problematic the adequacy of the recent financial arrangements described above.

From the viewpoint of foreign investors--they would necessarily be numerous in an operation of nearly $1 billion in which France at best could only play a leadership role, conformity moreover, with its conception of the trilogy--this choice a priori does not have the characteristics of a necessity. Doubtless it would be more important for Western nations to be assured, through participating companies, of the regularity of a potential supply of this magnitude in aluminum. Again, it would be proper to have conditions which are sufficiently profitable to compensate in their opinion for the inconveniences that might arise out of overproduction, the possible closing of European factories and the concentration, in one place, of the extraction of ore, the manufacture of alumina and that of aluminum, preventing any neutralization of the political risks.

From Guinea's point of view, it does not seem that economic takeoff can be achieved, as it appeared to be at one time, by simle multiplication of bauxite deposits. With a production of 9 million tons, the Boke deposit poses no problem of exhaustion of reserves. At Fria, with 650,000 tons of alumina produced in 1979, for a theoretical maximum of 700,000 tons, the optimization of the present installations, thanks to a loan of 131 million francs, permits the envisaging on the so-called "20th anniversary," of improvements allowing the doubling of this production. The 65 precent share of the financial revenue which comes to Guinea from these two exploitations is satisfactory to that country. At Fria, as at Boke, but principally at Fria, for reasons of experience, the quality of Guinean staffing, including the higher echelons, is improving daily, while the number of expatriates is diminishing. Concurrently, the exploitation efforts involving the deposits at Aye-Koye, Dabola and Tougue are marking time. A basic disagreement on the sale price of Kindia ore continues to place the Guinean Government and the USSR at odds. In a general way, the trend appears to be to get the most out of what is in existence and which cost very dearly, rather than multiply, along with exploitation sites, general costs, social problems and technical risks.

Could a Trans-Guinean railway, running from the hematite slope of Mount Nimba, be another basis for economic takeoff? Other than the fact that it seems more logical to establish a source of energy before its user agent and that hematite can be evacuated under less difficult conditions by the Buchanan line of Libya, the obstacles encountered by the Gabonese Government in a similar operation, while its oil resources were better positioned than any other to assure the confidence of international investors, do not encourage the undertaking.

Technicians maintain that the Konkoure site does not permit staged construction, so that added to the difficulty of mobilizing sufficient start-up capital is that of having established other industries full-blown, to make the price of a kilowatt competitive, in a complete bauxite ore-to-aluminum processing cycle, industries whose profitability must be obtained through heavy consumption of energy, corresponding roughly to about one-half of the installed capacity of the future hydroelectric power plant. In fact, the problem seems to be sufficiently thorny, in the eyes of possible lenders (IBRD, Arab Funds, BEI [European Investment Bank] and Central Bank) to justify supplementary studies. Some of these studies, which were approved in 1980, cover certain technical aspects of the dam and the problems of resettling and housing the peoples from the expropriated lands. Thus, the meeting-to-meeting and study-to-study process is translated into hesitation on the part of investors, so that no one has entirely decided to place a bet but no one, on the other hand, is ready to throw in his cards.

The objectives raised are serious. At this juncture, however, it seems that the true responses are neither technical nor financial but political. Today, we find all the elements of development assembled in Guinea. It has a population whose experience acquired at Fria and Boke bears witness to its technical adaptive abilities. Bauxite reserves and iron ore by their volume justifying long-term investments and by their quality assuring that participations in their exploitation* are sufficient to prevent others from keeping these reserves concealed. Sources of energy. Climatic and soil conditions favorable for food crops for domestic consumption and export. In reality, it is enough that movement be imprinted on this complex organization, for whatever ends, so that its capacity for engendering new riches, of which everyone would have his share, will be demonstrated.

This initial impetus is perhaps only waiting for a supplementary dose of confidence to manifest itself, for example, in the form of an oil deposit, however modest it may be. In the absence of offshore prospectors, it is probably up to President Sekou Toure to administer such a dose.

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* USINOR and SOMER have a 4 percent share of the MIFERGUI [Iron Mining Company of Guinea] p 3010 [first two expansions unknown]

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GUINEA-BISSAU

COMMENTS ON NEW REGIME'S POSSIBLE POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3069

[Editorial: "Options Are Open"]

[Excerpts] The announcement of the 14 November coup d'etat in Guinea-Bissau, in which Joao Bernardo Vieira overthrew President Luis de Almeida Cabral caused less of a surprise than did the very conditions of its implementation.

The irritation of the people, caused by food shortages and electricity blackouts, as well as by serious underemployment deriving from the consequences of the war, the persisting drought and mismanagement, was aggravated by the increasing dissatisfaction of the native cadres brought about by the forced retirement of officers serving in an army that had become too numerous after the war of independence, and by the increasingly authoritarian behavior of President Cabral. Indeed, the amendment to the constitution adopted on 10 November broadened the power of the president to the detriment of the prime minister's authority.

According to reliable sources in Bissau, the debate within the PAIGC National Commission was heated. Opponents accused President Cabral of having increasingly appropriated the collegiate power granted by the constitution to the 15-member State Council and of having approved on his own spectacular projects such as the Cumere oil complex through loans contracted under debatable conditions while, at the same time, the people's basic needs were not satisfied. Charges of corruption were even brought against the president's immediate entourage, mainly composed of Cape Verdian mulattos.

As a matter of fact, the coup d'etat appears to be a nationalistic reflex against association with Cape Verde and against the tutelage of the mulattos who provide most of Guinea-Bissau's leading cadres.

This coup d'etat took place under such extraordinarily coincidental circumstances that it is difficult to view it as purely the result of fate.

The question, then, might well be asked, whether Major Gen Vieira, nicknamed by the Portuguese the "Che Guevara of Africa" and the military who constitute the majority in the new government--where not a single Cape Verdian can be found--were not assisted by foreign advisers. One can also wonder about the political orientation of the new authorities.

Already, the Praia government has announced its intention to repatriate all Cape Verdians established in Guinea-Bissau who may wish to return to the archipelago.

Their departure could jeopardize the administration at the national level; indeed, leadership in the provinces and rural areas is constituted by Bissauans. On the other hand, it is possible that a number of Guinea-Bissauans now living as refugees in Portugal or neighboring French-speaking countries will return to Bissau, thus partially replacing the Cape Verdians. While it is true that Cuban advisors are the most numerous in Bissau today--they are in charge of the reorganization of the health services and the army--the fact is that Guinea-Bissau is the recipient, just like Cape Verde, of appreciable assistance from the United States, France, the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and a number of other Western countries.

Guinea-Bissau's geographical location, bordered by Senegal in the north, and in the south and west by Guinea-Conakry (which hastened to recognize the new regime), as well as the disappointment vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, whose economic assistance proved modest while the implementation of the fishing agreement was most beneficial to the USSR, should prompt the new government in Bissau not to relax its ties with the West, but rather to strengthen them; as a matter of fact, it has already manifested its intention to do so. Doubtlessly, it is up to the West, by means of an intelligent policy and immediate food assistance, to prevent Guinea-Bissau from landing into the arms of the Soviet, even if they had expected to receive from the new leaders the kind of political support which Luis Cabral, faithful to the principle of nonalignment, had always denied them.

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MOZAMBIQUE

ADF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT LOAN AGREEMENT DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Nov 80 p 3049

[Text] On 31 October, the African Development Fund (ADF) granted a loan of 8 million ADF units of account; i.e., about $9.8 million, to Mozambique to finance the Inhassune-Ramahusoa agricultural development program. The loan is repayable in 50 years, including a 10-year grace period.

The project has the following objectives: 1. to increase cotton and sunflower production to assure the country of foreign exchange returns; 2. to produce beef for the inhabitants of Inhambane and other cities, which will permit savings in foreign exchange, thanks to a decrease in imports; 3. to create jobs for unemployed or underemployed persons and to promote a general improvement in the standard of living; 4. to lay down the foundations for the later development of the agricultural sector, because of the fact that the project will have a demonstration effect and will permit the training, through contact with experts, of persons employed by the large state sectors, cooperatives and other activities.

The project has its sights on the utilization of 6,000 hectares for the growing of cotton and sunflowers and for a 41,000-hectare ranch for cattle raising. The cost of the project is estimated at $15.35 million, including $9.75 millions in foreign exchange. The project will be financed jointly by the ADF and the government of Mozambique, with the ADF loan serving to finance 100 percent of the costs in foreign exchange; i.e., 63.4 percent of the project's total cost. The execution of the project will be spread over 4 years and will be started in 1981. The project will be implemented by a management group established for this specific purpose. The beneficiary and organization of execution will be the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture.

The market for the supplying of the totality of machinery, materials and vehicles, as well as the technical assistance contract, will be awarded following an international call for bids. The labor markets for the construction of the various buildings (offices, housing for personnel, stores) will be awarded on the basis of a local bids procedure. Imported production factors will be acquired by the specialized state enterprise which awards grouped orders on the basis of a call for international bids. Cattle will be purchased in neighboring countries, except for the Republic of South Africa.

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MOZAMBIQUE

DETAILS OF MAPUTO, MATOLA PORT INSTALLATIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p2693

[Report: "Equipment of the Maputo-Matola Port Complex"]

[Text] On various occasions we have drawn the attention of our readers on the particular importance of Mozambican ports which are the "lungs" not only of the country itself but also of the enclaved neighboring countries. This importance was particularly emphasized at the Lusaka meeting on transportation.

As the daily NOTICIAS DA BEIRA recently reminded us, Maputo is the meeting point of three railroad tracks: one leading to Swaziland, the second to South Africa, and the third to Zimbabwe and, from there, to Zamia and Zaire. The Maputo port, whose construction was undertaken at the end of the 19th century at the merger of three rivers, currently covers a surface of 30 square kilometers in a north-east/south-west axis which provides good shelter from the winds and storms from the southeast which hit the coast. The quay is almost three kilometers long in an almost straight line.

All along the quay a 22-meter wide terrace has been built equipped with 74 electric cranes with a capacity ranging from 3 to 80 tons. Railroad cars come close to the ships along three rail spurs for loading or unloading exported or imported goods.

Beyond the terrace there are 28 hangars (38,000 square meters) with a capacity for 276,000 tons of merchandise, 23 roofed areas (5,920 cubic meters) and several goods depots. Three service lines are located in the back.

Let us note that the terrace is equally equipped with electric powered machinery with a capacity for loading 800 tons of coal per hour. The coal is hauled to a special depot with a capacity for 96,000 tons.

The port has refrigeration capacities for 7,500 tons of fruits; they are built in such a way as to allow the direct loading of the cases from the warehouse to the ship. There is a fish deep-freezing installation consisting of two holds, each of which has a 100-ton capacity.

The containers ramp, completed in 1971, covers 50,000 square meters along the bay. The steel ramp allows the simultaneous loading of three ships drawing up to 37 feet, using four cranes and 12 hoists with a 12 ton capacity.

The Maputo port can handle substantial amounts of various minerals. Areas are available for stocking this type of goods (1.4 million tons of minerals in bulk and 30,000 tons of copper).

The sugar complex has installations for the following operations: weighing of cars, unloading of cars at a pace of 350 tons per hour, conveyor belts, continuing weighing, loading ships at a pace of 150 tons an hour, and silos for bulk sugar (80,000 tons).

Recently 50,000 ton capacity grain silos were built which could be loaded or unloaded at the rate of 800 tons per hour.

Over 200 mechanical systems, mobile cranes, forklift trucks, and maneuvering and trailing tractors complete the equipment of Maputo port.

The Matola wharf, built in 1964, specializing in liquid bulk fuels, is located six kilometers away. It has the proper installations and pipes connecting tankers to the fuel depots whose total capacity is 160,000 tons. It is here that the crude oil from the gulf is unloaded and the fuel shipped to South Africa and to the entire Mozambican coast is loaded.

Equally installed on a landfill in Matola are wharfs and timeber warehouses.

A new wharf 280 meters long with the necessary installations for the handling of bulk minerals has been built. Loading speed is 3,000 tons per hour. It is through here that the iron ore from Swaziland and magnatite and chromium from south Africa are shipped in transit. These installations have relieved the Maputo port from such operations.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

BRITISH RAILROAD ASSISTANCE VIEWED--The Ministry of Overseas Development has instructed a group of 11 British experts to study the possibility of improving the Beira-Nacala railroad in order to foster the development of Mozambican coal exports, which will play an increasingly important part in the country's economy. The railroad's modernization should make possible the transportation of 10 million tons of coal a year. The cost of the survey will be paid by the Ministry; it will last approximately 6 months. The group will submit its recommendations to the Government of Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3114]

ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH INDIA--India and Mozambique signed in New Delhi a document specifying the fields of economic cooperation between the two countries. An official communique mentions that India could help Mozambique develop its railroad and river communications, improve its port facilities and also contribute its expertise in the field of tea processing and rubber plantations. The document was signed by Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs Narasimha Rao and Mozambican Minister of Transportation and Communications Luis Maria Alcantara Santos. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3114]

CSO: 4400

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

LIMITED TRAFFIC AT YOFF AIRPORT--The Dakar-Yoff Airport traffic has, progressively, decreased since June, following the closing down of the main runway, built in 1975. Reinforcing work is currently under way. Meanwhile, the traffic is being handled normally on the secondary runway which handles planes less than 15 tons, such as Air-Senegal, Air-Bissau and Senegalese military aircraft. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2676] 9626

NATIONAL ENERGY COMMISSION--Senegal has organized a National Energy Commission, charged with proposing to the government a coherent energy policy and coordinating its application, according to a decree adopted by the Councils of Ministers, 21 October. Senegal, a nonoil producing nation will spend 50 thousand CFA francs in 1980 for its supply of crude and wishes to reduce the effects of increase of oil prices on its economy. According to a communique by the Ministry of Information, predicted energy policy will be founded on supply diversification and energy saving. This policy will also consist of using very abundant and very economic energy sources and, above all, the country's own resources, adds the communique. Among them figure peat fields, discovered near Dakar, as well as in the North-Central and South of Senegal, but also forest resources, solar energy and peanut shells, not to mention two hydraulic dams, whose construction should begin this year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2671] 9626

OIL SUPPLY PROBLEMS--The Iran-Iraq conflict could have repercussions on the Senegalese economy. As a matter of fact, 60 percent of Senegalese oil supplies come from Iraq. According to Dusmane Fall, general-director of the African Refining Company (SAR), Senegal counts on 30 days supply of crude and an average of 40 days supply of refined oil derivatives. Taking into consideration their next deliveries, oil supplies are assured until December. This year, Senegal will consume 170,000 tons of refined products and 800,000 tons of crude. From this total, 40,000 tons of refined products are sold in Mauritania and an equal amount is sold in Mali, country which buys, essentially from Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Mauritania has a refinery, but it is not yet working. SAR doesn't yet have necessary facilities to treat less expensive sulphurous crude. But the refinery's expansion program should allow it to raise its capacity from 900,000 tons to 1,200,000 tons. The project has not yet been implemented due to financial difficulties. Its cost is running up to 14 thousand CFA francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 31 Oct 80 p 2671] 9629

CSO: 4400

TANZANIA

BRIEFS

HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FINANCING--TANESCO (Tanzania Electric Supply Company) has decided to work with three European companies to build a hydroelectric plant at a cost of 4440 million Tanzanian shillings, including the construction of relay-stations and electric lines from the hydroelectric central in Kidatu-Mufindi line at a cost of 160 million shillings. Financing will be partially guaranteed by ADB [African Development Bank], OPEC and credit guarantors. Siemens, for their part, will build Kidatu, Iringa and Mufindi relay-stations (cost: 96 million shillings). ADB and CEC (Commonwealth Development Corporation) will guarantee financing. Finally, SAE [expansion unknown], an Italian company will build the Mufindi-Mbeya line (240 km), which represents a contract of 184 million shillings. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2686] 9626

IDA AID--The World Bank Branch of the International Development Association (IDA), just announced that a technical aid program in Tanzania will receive a credit of 8.4 million DTS (11 million dollars) from them for services of consultation, creation and organization, as well as preparation and implementation of programs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2686] 9626

FED ROAD CONSTRUCTION AID--European Development Funds (FED) will subsidize 20 million units of account for the construction of the Lusahanga-Bukombi Tanzanian railroad section of the route connecting Rwanda and Burundi at the Dar-es-Salam harbor. See details above, under the heading "Courrier de Bruxelles." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2686] 9626

CANADIAN FRENCH FOOD AID--A cargo of 9,700 tons of wheat, a Canadian donation from its food aid program to Tanzania for 1980-81, arrived at Dar-es-Salam at the end of October. France has also delivered 1,655 tons of flour to Tanzania, according to an agreement signed last June. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2686]

CSO: 4400

TOGO

OFFICIAL OUTLINES PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2676

[Report: "Draft 1981 Finance Bill Submitted to National Assembly"]

[Excerpt] The draft finance bill of Togo for the 1981 fiscal year, totaling, as we reported (MTM, 17 October 1980, p 2555) 70,658,000,000 CFA in revenue and expenditures, was submitted on 14 October to the National Assembly by Tete Tevi Benissan, minister of finance and the economy.

After submitting a report on the world's economic situation, Tevi Benissan outlined his country's economic situation.

In the first six months of the 1979-1980 campaign a total of 10,350 tons of cocoa beans were sold as compared with 9,700 tons over the same period of the 1978-1979 campaign. The renovation campaign launched 4 years ago is, therefore, beginning to bear fruit.

The marketing of coffee beans had a similar development: 5,140 tons sold as against 3,145 tons in the preceding campaign. Should weather conditions remain stable, within a relatively short time we could hope to reach the record-setting levels of the 1971-1972 campaign. As to cotton, which jumped substantially from 4,515 tons to 12,670 tons in the 1978-1979 campaign, there are strong possibilities of maintaining production at a high level."

In the industrial areas Togo's economic health has shown substantial progress with the commissioning of the Cimao furnaces for the production of clinker supplied to the grinding stations of the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Togo. A new cell for "gas bottling" was added to the refinery which resumed its work. Let us also note the commissioning of the Agou oil manufacturing plant and the forthcoming opening of Togotex in Lama-Kara.

In the field of transportation let us note the completion of the building of the Lome-Dapaon National Unity Highway and the continuing work on the extension of the deep sea port of Lome. Goods traffic at the port of Lome has been growing steadily: In the first quarter of 1980 253,598 tons were unloaded compared with 132,100 tons over the same period in 1979. In the first 4 months of 1980 212,300 tons of goods were loaded as against no more than 47,200 tons in the first two quarters of 1979.

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TOGO

BRIEFS

FRG PORT EXTENSION LOAN--A Togolese delegation led by the minister of planning and administrative reform visited Bonn from 3 to 6 November. The two sides expressed satisfaction at the smooth implementation of the program set up in 1977 pertaining to agriculture, rural hydraulics, economic infrastructure and animal husbandry. They also signed a loan agreement for the extension of the port of Lome amounting to 50 million DM, or approximately 5.5 billion CFA. The two delegations then exchanged views on future financial cooperation between the two countries beginning in 1982. The fields to be covered will be rural development, economic infrastructure and renewable energy. The program of technical cooperation will continue at an accelerated pace. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3094]

CSO: 4400

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

ITALIAN COMMERCIAL DELEGATION--A 15-member Chamber of Commerce delegation from the Italian province of Piacenza, led by Mr Maerati, director of the exporter association in this province, stopped off in Kinshasa late in September. The delegation, which was carrying out a trade canvassing mission, was greeted by ANEZA (National Association of Zairain Enterprises) and had made contact with several private and Zairian semipublic companies, with which it initiated negotiations. Mr Maserati, on this occasion, made it known that some contacts were underway between Italian financiers and Zairian authorities to open a line of credit to promote the importation of Italian equipment goods in Zaire. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2684] 8870

INDEMNIFICATION OF SWISS RESIDENTS--Pursuant to measures for the nationalization of Zaire economy approved in 1973 and 1974, an agreement providing for the indemnification of Swiss residents was signed by Switzerland and Zaire last 8 October in Kinshasa. According to this agreement, the Zairian Government will deposit a total and contractual indemnity of some 3.0 million zaires (about 1.8 million Swiss francs) for Swiss property and interest accrued. The terms of the discussion on indemnity, they point out in Berne, are still to be the "subject of measures of a technical nature between the two parties." The Swiss federal parliament and competent Zairian authorities are to confirm the agreement. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2684] 8870

OIL PROSPECTING--In our No 1819 of 19 September (p 2303), we discussed that the American ESSO company had established a subsidiary company in Zaire to pursue the work of prospecting oil in the Oshwe area. It should be noted that TEXACO Inc has also established a Zairian subsidiary company, Texaco-Zaire Prospecting [SARL], which has obtained a permit for petroleum research in Zaire's central basin. ESSO-Zaire Prospecting shares in 50 percent of Texaco-Zaire Prospecting for the utilization of this research permit and the agreements between the two companies have stipulated that the ESSO company would see to coordinating the work on behalf of the company. The program involves the drilling of two 4,000-meter deep wells. The work will take about 18 months at the investment expense of around $50 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Oct 80 p 2684] 8870

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ZIMBABWE

FIRST MONTHS OF INDEPENDENCE VIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Nov 80 pp 41-47

[Article by special correspondent Francois Soudan: "Zimbabwe in Danger of Peace"]

[Text] Seven months of independence after 7 years of war: For Zimbabwe, the time has come for an initial review. Robert Mugabe gave us his own conclusions: "Let us say that, in overall terms, I am more satisfied than disappointed. If we look at the heritage we had to take over, I think that the record so far is rather positive." Nevertheless, there is no shortage of problems: Reclassification of guerilla fighters, the "Tekere affair," white emigration, and national reconstruction. Francois Soudan has just spent 3 weeks in Zimbabwe. In March he had already "covered" for JEUNE AFRIQUE the elections which brought Robert Mugabe to power. He tells us about the changes and the first steps of the youngest among the African states. Denis Ropa explains why the Western powers are still hesitating to aid Zimbabwe. Joseph Lelyveld finally went to interview a white community which says it is "ready to play the game because that is the will of God": the Afrikaners of Zimbabwe.

"Hey! The milksop has returned to the fold! If you need any further proof that this dirty war is over, here it is: Rocky, who always had the shakes, has just brought the cashbox back!" With this rather not at all refined language of the white farmers--"slang" as they call it here--Patrick Donohue, 38, leans back in his rocking chair, laughing. In his lap, the HERALD, the biggest daily in Zimbabwe, where you can read that Rodman Rockefeller, the son of Nelson, former vice president of the United States and a substantial stockholder in the world's biggest private company, Exxon, will soon come to Salisbury to visit the huge chicken farm at Arbor Acres which the Rockefeller family owns. Just 6 years earlier, in 1974, when Nelson ran in the American elections as Gerald Ford's running mate, the "Rocky" clan, with the look of an offended virgin, denied any kind of relationship with racist Rhodesia.

"Zimbabwe!": With Zairian-Reggae syncopated rhythm, Highfield--a big black suburb in Salisbury--is dancing Saturday night to the latest hit tune by Oliver Mutukudzi, the country's most popular singer.

"Are you happy? Are you free? Yes, then you are a Zimbabwean!" There is no doubt in the mind of anybody who makes the rounds during weekend nights in the loud beer halls in the suburbs: The people of Zimbabwe seem to have been floating in euphoria for more than 6 months. But on Monday morning, when the fog of the chibuku--the African beer made by the whites and consumed from Malawi all the way to South Africa--has disappeared, there is a bitter taste left.

Wearing a T-shirt with a huge and paradoxical message reading "Rhodesia is super," sunglasses on his nose, Peter Mwabu, 20, sighs: "Mugabe is the leader of the people. Even those who support Nkomo will tell you that he is a good fellow. The only trouble is that I have been unemployed for the past 2 years; whether it is Rhodesia or Zimbabwe, I do not have a job."

These initial feelings of frustration, 17 months after independence (17 April) can be heard above all among the intellectuals and the black petty bourgeoisie. Profoundly nationalist, teachers trained in Anglo-Saxon universities or businessmen in the suburbs, they hate having their social rise blocked by the motionlessness of real "reserved jobs" for whites only. This is true even though they live today in mansions with swimming pools and gardens in the huge European residential sections, such as Avondale, Mount-Pleasant, and Fontainebleau, whose owners have emigrated.

Olley Maruma, 32, a television journalist since April 1980, said: "My salary? Well, 800 dollars (about 264,000 francs CFA [African Financial Community]) per month. That is 20 times what a black laborer makes. O.K. But that is barely the same earned by a white prison guard" (one Zimbabwean dollar is equivalent to F6.6 or 330 francs CFA). Michael Mutungwende, 30, with a master's degree in sociology from the University of Vincennes, France, commented: "I have been looking for the past 4 months and I have not found anything except at ridiculously low salaries. I agree that the Europeans, who are really indispensable to the economy, should stay. But the others, the little whites, who are ensconced in their offices--are they going to stay there until they retire?" For them, as for writer Wilson Katiyo, who speaks of "cosmetic decolonization," the Lancaster House Accords left the best part to the white minority particularly by refusing to change the job structure.

These are natural frustrations which undoubtedly are inevitable in the particular context of Zimbabwe. But these frustrations are hardly dangerous to the country's equilibrium although a slight disaffection seems to be rising against the entourage of the prime minister. The risk comes mostly from those who are called "comrades," "boys," "guys," or "freedom fighters," in other words, 33,000 guerilla fighters who, since the ceasefire, for almost 10 months now, have been confined in camps sometimes surrounded by barbed wire, the so-called assembly points.

In the beginning, these fighters--most of whom (23,000) belonged to ZANLA [Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army], the armed fraction of Mugabe's party, ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union]--were supposed to stay in their hastily put-up tents only until the proclamation of independence on 17 April. But their integration into the new national army has not yet been accomplished. Especially not since only 7,000 among them opted to return to civilian life. Many are living under deplorable hygienic and nutritional conditions, especially in the assembly points which are furthest away from the cities, such as the one on Sabi River, not far from the Mozambican border, where cases of typhus have been reported. They expect great things from their victory, too much, undoubtedly. Their disappointment has made them nervous and sensitive to the maximalist diatribes of a man such as Edgar Tekere, the minister who has been officially charged (see below).

There are 800 guerilla fighters who are particularly nervous and whose camp touched on "white" land in the region of Goromonzi; they have been disarmed. To the less impatient ones, Mugabe explained, in the course of a meeting held on 13 September at assembly point "x-ray," the outline for the future force.

The national army will have a basic nucleus of nine battalions, or 10,000 men, recruited from among the elite of the guerilla fighters, both ZANLA and ZIPRA [Zimbabwe People's Liberation Army] (the armed segment of the ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union] of interior minister Joshua Nkomo). Around this nucleus will be lined up almost all of the Rhodesian African Rifles , the old black division of Ian Smith, the rather reluctant government soldiers of Zimbabwe. Coming from the Shona tribe for the most part, the RAR [Rhodesian African Rifles] and some of their white officers have full confidence in the prime minister. The rest of the freedom fighters, that is to say, the youngest (some of them are not even 16) and the less well-trained will become peasant-militiamen, in other words, soldiers in the morning and farmers in the afternoon.

While waiting in their barracks or their state farm, a portion of the guerilla fighters, with their Kalashnikovs, will be housed in two concrete townships guarded by the army: Chitungwiza (30 kilometers from Salisbury) and Entumbane (not far from Bulawayo, the country's second-largest city). How are these wild warriors, without much cohesion, going to be accepted by the civilian population? Not too well, it seems. At Chitungwiza, in particular, a "black" town where they local petty gourgeoisie and above all the squatters in the huge slums of Chiramba-huyo, to whom the little houses in the township were to be allocated on a priority basis, the people do not conceal their fear and their discontent. For them, the "mauto ekudya," the army of hunger, should move on.

The problem of reclassifying the old guerilla fighters is all the more delicate for Robert Mugabe since it serves as an issue to be exploited by his political opponents. The friends of Edgar Tekere have for a long time been criticizing the "ingratitude" of the government toward the fighting men. This has been echoed by many ZAPU militants--headed by Dumiso Dabengwa, chief of party security services and an open pro-Soviet official. They explain that those 9,000 men of ZIPRA are still based in Zambia because no decent structure has been provided in Zimbabwe for receiving them.

Their leader, Joshua Nkomo, who rather loyally plays his role as interior minister, is as a matter of fact not at all safe; a diabetic with a heart ailment, moving from an overstuffed easy chair to a reinforced chair, he seems to be absent from the political scene. And then it is whispered that he is a little bit too familiar with his brandy bottles. For the time being, except for some tracts distributed in July regarding the moves by the Tekere people, Robert Mugabe has hardly bothered him.

We must also credit the 6 months of "Mugabe's law" with some initial decisive steps toward total decolonization. In the agricultural area, where the task is tremendous, the government has begun to resettle the 150,000 families whom the Rhodesian Army had put up in the protected villages. The operation will take some time because certain lands by the end of the war were deliberately ravaged by the troops of Ian Smith who wanted to cut the guerillas off from any food supply. But it remains a priority among the objectives for the next 2 years. The resettled peasants are encouraged to organize in cooperatives according to a mixed system which is half way between the Tanzanian Ujamaa and the Kenyan Harambee and which, it is hoped, will avoid the collectivist heaviness of one and the excessive liberalism of the other.

The 5,000 white farmers, who own half of the country's land, are being urged to stay to the extent that they are productive; this is not true of 43 percent of them who show a deficit or who are absentee landowners. Those whose operations are profitable were subsidized (the farm owned by Ian Smith, at Selukwe, was one of the first beneficiaries). The others are getting proposals for purchase at an honorable price. The land thus recovered will be either distributed to the poor peasants or will be turned into government farms.

There is the same desire for reformism here and the same concern for realism in the mining sector. Zimbabwe has gold, chrome, coal, copper, nickel, iron, silver, cobalt, tin, and asbestos. These minerals are being mined by about half a score of foreign companies whose capital comes from South Africa (Anglo-American, Messina Transvaal), from Great Britain (Lonrho, Rio Tinto, Falconbridge), or the United States (Union Carbide). On the positive side, these multinationals invest, they do prospecting, and they pay their miners 25 percent more than the new legal minimum wage. On the negative side they hold 65 percent of the capital invested in the country; the rest is distributed among 220 other foreign companies and some Zimbabwean companies (18 percent).

The government is thus trying to make the best of the situation. Said mining minister Maurice Nyagumbo, 56: "The multinationals are of interest to us because they invest, because they provide a living for 300,000 people, and because, to a certain extent, they have a social policy. But, watch out: Do not interfere in our political decisions!"

Pious wishes? Not at all! David Trott, manager, for Lonrho, the gold mine at Shamva, is not unaware of that. "Zimbabwe is a great country for the mining companies: easy extraction, modern infrastructure, and competent workers and that adds up to big profits. In all of Africa, you will find similar conditions only in Transvaal. Why should we interfere in politics when the government has effective means of retaliation? It could put us into the hands of worker committees or radical labor unions and, who knows, it could nationalize us!"

Very anxious to get back into the good graces of the government, the "multis" proposed numerous association projects to it. Two of them have already seen the light of day in cooperation with Anglo-American: The expansion of the thermal power plant at Wankie and the "ethanol plan" of Triangle where a vast complex for converting sugar cane into gasoline will meet 25 percent of the nation's fuel requirements starting in 1982.

Parallel to that, the leaders, with much vehemence, are trying to promote the creation of a black business bourgeoisie. On 21 September, Eddison Zvogbo, minister of construction and local communities, gave 150 Zimbabweans, wearing shirt, tie, and jacket, in a hotel in Highfield, a real lesson in business: "You must have the spirit of competition! Broaden your horizons! Watch the example of the way in which the Afrikaners seized economic power from the English-speaking community in South Africa. Without economic power, we are nothing. Compared to the whites here, you are just a bunch of kids! You must fight, bloody hell!"

The whites are watching and waiting. Emigration has caused some of them to leave, to be sure, but it is no greater than what it was during the last years of the war and those who leave generally held subordinate positions. Those who remain continue to live exactly as before.

Between the 5 o'clock tea and the barbecues by the poolside, between a weekend of water-skiing at Kariba and a race at Marbelreigh, they talk about "black faces" while clearing their throats.

All of them, to be sure, do not display the same kind of contempt and some are ready to play the game of majority rule.

The policy of equilibrium pursued by Robert Mugabe is a difficult one. There is a thin line stretched between a European community which, quite often, refuses to admit that it now consists of "white Zimbabweans," but whom the young state needs for the time being, as well as the African people, worried about gathering the first fruits of independence which they had dreamed about for 7 years. "The first 6 months were the months of the status quo," Mugabe declared. "The next 6 months will be the time of reforms. The time of revolutions has not yet come."

Provided of course the line does not break.

Cooperation Nowhere To Be Found
By Denis Ropa

Lord Christopher Soames, the last British governor of Rhodesia, declared on 21 October, in addressing the Chamber of Commerce in London, that the West was risking "a new Angola" if the governments and the industrialists did not invest heavily in Zimbabwe.

Ever since he took power, Robert Mugabe has been devoting himself to the task of reconstruction and reconciliation in his country. But the lack of cadres and skilled workers, the difficulties in restoring communications at home and abroad in a country ravaged by 7 years of civil war, are slowing reconstruction down. There is also conflict between the subsistence economy of the Tribal Trust Land, where 4 million Zimbabweans live with an annual income on the order of 10,000 francs CFA, and a modern agricultural and industrial sector, where the minimum wage has just been raised to the equivalent of 120,000 francs CFA per year--that is another factor to be considered.

To overcome all these obstacles, the prime minister needs political stability but also foreign investments. The total amount of aid envisaged by Henry Kissinger had already been estimated at $1 billion back in 1976. Bernard Chidzero, the Zimbabwean planning minister, a man whom Mugabe trusts, today estimates the total cost of a development plan capable of "once and for all eliminating the pockets of underdevelopment," at $4 billion.

While the western companies are convinced of the need for meeting these demands, the governments seem to be more reluctant. By offering 75 million Pounds Sterling over a period of 3 years, Great Britain proved to be the most "generous." American President Carter was able to promise only $25 million in immediate aid over a period of 18 months.

With the countries of the EEC, Austria, and Japan, the total aid volume assured for 1980 did not even come to $250 million or 1/16 of what Minister Chidzero had proposed and one-quarter of what Kissinger had estimated as a minimum.

Tekere Went Too Far
By F.S.

Accused, along with seven of his bodyguards, of having participated on 4 August in the murder of the white farmer Gerard William Adams (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1025), Edgar Tekere at the age of 43 is one of the best-known politicians in Zimbabwe and undoubtedly the one who is most hated by the white minority.

Appointed manpower minister on 11 March 1980--a job less than what he had expected--Edgar Tekere soon used his influence within ZANU (he is the number three man in the party) in order forcefully to criticize the "policy of reconciliation" of Robert Mugabe. He came out in favor of a single party; he talks about "scraps of paper" in connection with the Lancaster House Accords; he attacks the "racism" of the Anglican Church; he thinks that the whites constitute a "mercenary community" and he calls Joshua Nkomo a "big megalomaniac." To a certain extent he has managed to become the spokesman of those--guerilla fighters in the assembly points--young employed people in the townships--whom their situation makes vulnerable to simplistic phraseologies. But he undoubtedly went too far in criticizing especially Robert Mugabe.

Ever since he has been officially charged and after spending several days in the Chikurubi prison, Edgar Tekere has been sleeping with a Chinese pistol under his pillow, walking around in the hallways of his mansion at Saint Martins, with a Kalashnikov across his back, drinking brandy out of teacups and listening to reggae music. He rejected his ini .al defense attorneys--a law office in Salisbury--and contacted two London lawyers, one of whom by the name of John Jackson is a South African who was exiled for political reasons. A third one then came to direct the team; he is Louis Bloom-Cooper, a big name in the British legal profession, who has already defended Soviet and Tanzanian dissidents. Who pays the bills? A Swedish businessman who is rich, a Third Worldist, and who prefers to remain anonymous.

Edgar Tekere a "dissident?" Not at all. He simply puts his finger on the initial slow pace of decolonization. But he does not come up with any answers. Is he a demagogue? Perhaps. Ambitious he is, certainly. Regardless of what the verdict at the end of his trial may be--and it is supposed to start on 3 November--the fact remains that his most fervent supporters undoubtedly will not take up arms for him.

God Wanted Mugabe

By Joseph Lelyveld

In the region of Enkeldoorn, 150 kilometers from Salisbury, lives an Afrikaner by the name of Cornelius Hoffman. The great-grandson of the former president of the Oranje Free State, heir of a pioneer of the last century, he has a long beard that makes him look like a real patriarch. Neither his convictions, nor his way of life have changed; still, Cornelius Hoffman considers himself a complete Zimbabwean. Living as a simple citizen, under a black government, does not bother him. With the war over, his farm is no longer in danger. That both confused and pleasant dream leaves him perplexed. "We have had a real revolution here," he says hesitantly, "and still, I did not get to feel anything."

The majority of "Rhodesians" of British origin think that history has short-changed them. Very few of them feel safe under the new regime of Mugabe which is barely 7 months old. But Afrikaners like Cornelius Hoffman, settlers of Dutch origin who came from South Africa, are different from the descendants of Cecil Rhodes. God had intimately linked their destiny to the history of the African continent. Thus they easily identify with their cousins on the Cape. While the "British" can emigrate to Great Britain, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand, the Afrikaners have only one destination and that is South Africa. Many of them have already left to go there and a little more than 10,000 are still there.

Farmer Cornelius Hoffman admits that the idea of a black government was repugnant to him. But now, the Mugabe regime seems to him to reflect the divine will. "I respect him as such." This divine order is something which the Afrikaners of South Africa, it seems, according to Cornelius, appear to be inclined somewhat to forget. "They are so independent that they no longer go to God. Everything comes from their creation. I think that God is about to punish them." To his nephew, who wanted to take his sister to emigrate to South Africa, he said in reply: "Down there, you will be sitting on a time bomb. When it blows up, you will not know what hit you."

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